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Japanese monetary authorities used to employ various intervention techniques to adjust 
the level of the dollar/yen exchange rate and reduce its volatility. Application of 
the GARCH-in-mean model for estimation of the effect of these operations 
demonstrates that depreciating interventions reduced volatility effectively from 1995 
until 2002. Frequent interventions of the small scale had a tendency to increase 
volatility during period 1991-1995. Foreign exchange interventions conducted by 
US Fed have increasing, means negative, effect, on the conditional variance. Frequent 
interventions of the great scale do not affect the volatility; it is determined mostly by 
the persistent level of the conditional variance from the latter periods. Recent 
interventions conducted by the Bank of Japan after the financial crisis do not show any 
considerable effect on both the volatility and the level of the exchange rate. 
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Proposed Topic: 
Effects of foreign exchange interventions on volatility of dollar/yen exchange rate 
Motivation: 
After United States dollar and the euro, Japanese yen is the third largest currency 
traded in the foreign exchange market (FX market). It is also often described by traders as 
a “safe heavens” currency. 
Currency pair USD/JPY, in particular, is traded in the highest volume compared to 
other pairs coupled with yen. Cyclical appreciation in tandem with global economic 
recessions is, therefore, expected of yen. To that effect, suspicion of seasonality in the time 
series is a grounded assumption. But most importantly, exchange rate policies, over the last 
three decades, have impacted the yen volatility more than any other factor. 
Similar to the United States, Japanese government preserve the right to oversee 
exchange rate matters. A segregated monetary oversight in Japan is carried out by both the 
Bank of Japan (BoJ) and Ministry of Finance (MoF). Each is respectively in charge of 
domestic and foreign monetary policies. Under auspices of International Finance Bureau 
(IFB), a bureau of MoF, issues such as exchange rate stability and currency 
internationalisation are dealt with independent of the Central banking authority to a major 
extend. In doing so, IFB intervenes in the FX market at times officially and most of the time 
secretively. Ito (as cited in Tagaki 2015) considers 1995 and 2004 the “dividing points” in 
intervention tactic paradigm shift. Before the appointment of Eisuke Sakakibara in 1995, he 
states, the Bureau intervened in the FX market frequently and in small sums. The pattern 
took an opposite from post-1995, where interventions were carried out barely one time every 
two months yet in notably higher amounts. Whereas after 2004, when Mizoguchi took over 
the office, the tactic turned hawkish meaning the interventions became both more frequent 
and larger in size.  
Dukich, Kim, and Lin (2010) evaluate the performance of GARCH models for 
modelling daily changes in logarithmic exchange rates. They consider three exchange rate 
series - GBP/USD, JPY/USD, EUR/USD. For each sequence, the authors fit three GARCH 
models, with varying numbers of parameters, and attempt to replicate the empirical 
sequence via simulation. GARCH (1,1), GARCH (1,2), GARCH (2,1) models are used, and 
then the adequacy of each model is assessed. Tests of model adequacy are performed by 
simulating each GARCH model and comparing it to the corresponding empirical sequence. 
None of the GARCH models considered in the analysis captures the empirical nature of the 
exchange rate series particularly well; each model failed to adequately reproduce the 
sudden shift in variability associated with the financial crisis. Moreover, histograms of the 
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residuals show mixed results. Residuals for the JPY/USD sequence appear to be slightly 
heavier-tailed or skewed left. Thus, while each sequence satisfies the assumptions 
underlying the GARCH model, the GARCH model does not appear to faithfully reflect the 
empirical nature of those sequences. 
There are also some papers which discuss the effects of Japanese foreign 
exchange intervention. Sterilised foreign exchange interventions were a subject of 
discussion on their capability to achieve a desired level of the exchange rate or reduce 
volatility. According to Rogoff (1984) in the portfolio balance models foreign and domestic 
assets are imperfect substitutes and, as a result, sterilised intervention can influence the 
exchange rate by changing the relative supplies and thereby the relative returns of foreign 
and domestic assets. According to Sarno and Taylor (2001), most of the papers from the 
past provide one with more evidence for the successful interventions; there are also 
conflicting results of the empirical studies on the effects of the foreign exchange rate 
intervention on the volatility as well as the level of the exchange rate. 
In Japan, foreign exchange intervention was a widely used tool of the monetary 
policy until recent times. And, as a result, there are various points of view on the scale of 
the effect that these operations have on the volatility and level of the exchange rate. 
Estimations vary from no influence at all to relationships of the opposite signs, although the 
same data are used (Ito 2003, Fatum and Hutchison 2003, Castren 2004, Watanabe and 
Harada 2006). 
Hillebrand and Schnabl (2006) studied the effects of Japanese foreign exchange 
interventions on the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate between April 1991 and 
October 2004 using daily intervention data released by the Japanese Ministry of Finance. 
There is contradictoriness detected in the GARCH estimations of the effect of Japanese 
foreign exchange intervention on the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate on the global 
level. At the same time, local estimations demonstrate that a structural break occurred 
around the turn of the millennium. As a result of a liquidity trap, Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention could effectively remain unsterilized. Authors come to the conclusion that up to 
the late 1990s, increased volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate is a consequence of 
Japanese foreign exchange intervention. Exchange rate volatility had been decreasing after 
the application of foreign exchange intervention after the year 1997, so the level of the 
yen/dollar exchange rate had a tendency to stabilise. 
Hypotheses: 
1. Hypothesis 1 – Effects of the BoJ’s interventions are not symmetric regarding the 
decreasing/increasing volatility of the USD/JPY exchange rate during the studying 
period from 1991 to 2011. 
2. Hypothesis 2 – The Japanese foreign exchange interventions do not have a long-
lived impact horizon. 
3. Hypothesis 3 – Large lot interventions of low frequency in the short run do not have 
higher stabilising power factor than the large lot interventions of high frequency. 
Methodology: 
As the topic is mostly related to the time series, it would be appropriate to use 
GARCH model to test hypothesis listed above. 
To test for the influence of the foreign exchange interventions on the USD/JPY 
exchange rate a multivariate GARCH model would be used following Chortareas, Jiang, 
Nankervis (2011). There will be a comparison of rolling estimations from three different data 
samples: 1991-2016, 1991-2000, 2001-2016. 
Three different intervention regimes are observed during the studied period started 
in 1991 and ended in 2016 and there are two „dividing points“ – 1995 and 2004. Univariate 
GARCH models obtained from three separated ranges of the time series as well as the 
whole data sample would provide the one with nuances of every different regime and 
answer two questions – if the time horizon of the Japan FX intervention is a short run and 
what type of intervention policy is the most effective one. 
There are two main sources of data which are going to be used in the study: 
• the USD/JPY exchange rate are closing spot prices by Investing.com; 




As it can be seen from the current economic environment, it is crucial for 
governments as well as central banks to manage currency in a careful and safe manner. 
One of the most recent papers on the topic is dated back to the year 2011, although MoF 
of Japan has conducted some interventions since that time, those interventions were 
excluded from the sample because they were conducted after the financial crisis 2008-2009. 
In this study, all the available information about the Japanese FX interventions is included 
into the data sample.  
The possible contribution of the study can be that it would help to evaluate the 
effectiveness of different types of intervention regimes according to the target of BoJ and, 
what is more important, choose the most appropriate one in the current economic 
environment. 
Outline: 
1. Introduction (motivation, history of the Japan foreign exchange interventions and their 
results). 
2. Analysis of the related literature (using of GARCH models in the academic papers 
which were focused on the volatility of the USD/JPY exchange rate and also 
examined the effect of the foreign exchange interventions on the volatility of the rate). 
3. Data description 
3.1. Exchange rate data (spot „close“ price of the USD/JPY exchange rate); 
3.2. Intervention data (information about interventions which were conducted by MoF 
starting from May 1991 until November 2011 – when the first and the last 
intervention took place respectively. I would also need to include time series of 
control variables because it is essential to remove, for example, the effect of 
changes in the stock market on the exchange rate). 
4. Methodology 
4.1. The multivariate GARCH model – interventions‘ effects on the USD/JPY 
exchange rate volatility for three different time periods: 1991-2016, 1991-2000, 
2001-2016. 
4.2. Analysis of the GARCH model and its estimation on the full data sample (aim is 
to examine the lived horizon of the BoJ’s intervention policy – if it id indeed short-
term). 
4.3. GARCH analysis of the effectiveness of different intervention policies – large lot 
frequent interventions vs. large lot infrequent interventions using the division of 
the full data sample into three different time series using the “dividing points” of 
1995 and 2004. 
5. Conclusion. 
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1. Introduction 
The present work is devoted to the analysis of such a problem as the 
effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions. Until recent times, interventions in the 
foreign exchange markets were probably the most secretive actions for the part of 
monetary authorities around the world. They have always been the cause of 
controversy, both in academia and among practitioners. Many economists, relying on 
known monetarist models of exchange rate formation, argue that interventions cannot 
be effective; It is also considered that the size of the foreign exchange market is 
infinitely large in comparison with the intervention operations, and thus neutrality 
arises. Others talk about efficiency in the sense that interventions affect course 
dynamics through the channel of expectations. Some models - the so-called portfolio 
models - consider changing the risk for securities nominated in different currencies as 
a decisive factor of the impact on the course through interventions. The dominance of 
these or other views on the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions has changed 
over the past several decades. Due to the availability of official publicly available data 
from the MoF and the US Fed, there is a real opportunity to assess the effectiveness of 
foreign exchange interventions from a statistical point of view and to evaluate their 
impact on the dynamics of the exchange rate and the stability of the foreign exchange 
market. 
After the US dollar and euro, Japanese yen is the third largest currency traded 
in the foreign exchange market. It is also often described by traders as a “safe heavens” 
currency. 
Currency pair US dollar and Japanese yen, in particular, is traded on the highest 
volume compared to other pairs coupled with yen. Cyclical appreciation in tandem with 
global economic recessions is, therefore, expected of yen. To that effect, suspicion of 
seasonality in the time series is a grounded assumption. But most importantly, 
exchange rate policies, over the last three decades, have impacted the yen volatility 
more than any other factor. 
There are two ways in which foreign exchange interventions can affect the 
market. Usually, the primary goal of the monetary authorities is to achieve a particular 
level of the exchange rate. Another possible target may be the reduction of the volatility 
of the exchange rate. 
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Most of the empirical studies which analyse the effectiveness of the foreign 
exchange interventions in Japan employ GARCH-like model specification as they are 
focused on the evaluation of time series and use officially released data by the MoF 
from the year 1991 till 2004. The problem is that all the variety of papers do not provide 
one with a coordinated and unequivocal opinion about the positive or negative effect 
which foreign exchange interventions have on the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange 
rate. 
In our study, we apply one more advanced GARCH-like model extension which 
is called GARCH-in-mean to account for the influence of the volatility on the level of 
the exchange rate and to control for the relationship between risk and return which is 
important for the financial assets. On the other hand, we also include external 
independent variables which are supposed to control for the effect of the interventions 
themselves, coordination of the Japanese unilateral operations with the US Fed as well 
as market conditions. 
The data sample is extended as we would like to have our analysis data driven 
so unlikely to most of the recent studies our full data sample includes a period from 
1991 till 2011 when the last intervention was conducted by the MoF on behalf of 
the BoJ. The full data sample is divided into four subsamples which represent various 
intervention techniques used by the Japanese monetary authorities. We expect to have 
different results on the significance and values of estimated coefficients for the 
interventions depending on the frequency and scale to verify or reject the generalised 
findings of the latter studies. 
In our study, we consider every intervention regime separately, so we do not 
conduct model estimation combining, for example, the first and the second regime or 
the second and the third one. On the one hand, it can lead us to the insignificance of 
the results, but at the same time, it provides us with the opportunity to assess pure 
differences in the intervention techniques of the BoJ. What is more, reverse causality 
problem is not addressed in our study, but in this problem, we will rely on the results 
of the previous studies, for example, Hillebrand and Schnabl (2006), who use reaction 
function to prove that changes in volatility do not trigger interventions, thus, 
simultaneity bias can be reasonably ruled out from our estimation. 
As we use GARCH-in-mean model, we can obtain results both for the influence 
of the foreign exchange interventions both on the level and the volatility of the 
dollar/yen exchange rate. 
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Thus, our main finding is that so-called “appreciating” interventions when 
US dollars were sold, and Japanese yens were bought do not have any considerable 
effect neither on the level nor the volatility of the currency market for each of 
the subsamples. While the “depreciating” interventions have affected the volatility 
under the first and second intervention regime, although the values of the estimated 
coefficients are tiny and have opposite signs. Intervention operations tended to increase 
volatility under the second regime when interventions were not frequent but of a large 
scale and decrease it under the first regime when interventions were frequent but of the 
small scale. 
The second important outcome is that under the regimes when the interventions 
alter the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate they were coordinated with the 
US Fed, so our finding regarding this supports the generalised results of the other 
researchers that only coordinated interventions seem to have an effect on the market 
stability. 
Contrary to our expectations we have not found the intervention technique 
under the third regime to be successful regarding the effect on the volatility. During 
this period the foreign exchange market in Japan was mostly affected by the market 
conditions in the US. Almost the same result we have for the fourth regime when 
interventions were not conducted in a systematic way, so there were the only series of 
single operations. 
As we can interpret our results the foreign exchange interventions have short-
lived horizon so to achieve the goal – whether it is a particular level of the exchange 
rate or reduced volatility – all the operations have to be planned for the long-term as 
we observe it under the first and the second intervention regime. The single operation 
does not have a considerable effect which lasts longer than one day so to support the 
lasting trend, there should be planned and consistent tactics. Otherwise, as we are going 
to obtain the results from the third and the fourth subsamples when even the high 
amount of money injected into the economy cannot change the situation on the market 
stability. 
The thesis is structured as follows: the next chapter reviews empirical papers 
which study the effectiveness of the foreign exchange interventions conducted by the 
Japanese monetary authorities. Chapter 3 provides the description of data which is used 
for the study and the methodology which is applied for the analysis. Chapter 4 is 
dedicated to the discussion of the results obtained from the estimation of the model. 
The final chapter summarises the most important outcomes and proposals. 
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2. Literature review 
Although some studies are analysing the impact of central bank interventions 
on exchange rates in associated markets, they offer varied results. Contradictory 
outcomes confirm the existence of different types of intervention policies which have 
been used in various sample periods for exchange rate regimes of concrete structures. 
This section reviews the findings of authors who have studied the effects of foreign 
exchange interventions on the level and volatility of the yen exchange rate against 
the dollar. 
Sterilised foreign exchange interventions were a subject of discussion on their 
capability to achieve a desired level of the exchange rate or reduce volatility. According 
to Rogoff (1984) in the portfolio balance models foreign and domestic assets are 
imperfect substitutes and, as a result, sterilised intervention can influence the exchange 
rate by changing the relative supplies and thereby the relative returns of foreign and 
domestic assets. According to Sarno and Taylor (2001), most of the papers from the 
past provide one with more evidence for the successful interventions; there are also 
conflicting results of the empirical studies on the effects of the foreign exchange rate 
intervention on the volatility as well as the level of the exchange rate. 
Dominguez (1998) analyses the effects of foreign exchange interventions 
performed by central banks on the volatility of exchange rates. The data used in the 
study includes quite a wide time range - from 1977 to 1994. The data presented relates 
to mark/dollar and yen/dollar exchange rates and interventions by the US, German and 
Japanese central banks. According to the paper, there is no reverse causality effect 
between intervention policy and exchange rate volatility thus this volatility does not 
have an effect on the decisions of monetary policy makers. The author also studies 
public and secret interventions which could have opposite effects on volatility. 
To reduce the variance of the exchange rate an intervention should be announced 
publicly and, on the other hand, secret intervention often makes the volatility level 
increase. The main outcome from the full data sample is that the interventions that have 
been reported increase both short- and long-term exchange rate volatility. In contrast, 
in the sample from the mid-1980s, the variance is decreased by this type of monetary 
policy. 
Beine, Laurent, and Lecourt (2001) employ a regime dependent approach in 
their paper which focuses on both level and volatility changes of exchange rates due to 
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the interventions performed. The data sample is 1985-1995 for the three most traded 
currencies of this historical period – mark/dollar and yen/dollar. In contrast to the 
previous studies, the authors come to the conclusion that reducing the volatility effect 
of the intervention can be demonstrated, depending on the volatility regime which 
currently prevails in the foreign exchange market. If there is a highly volatile market 
and intervention is expected to be performed, then the intervention stabilises the market 
(“the signalling approach”). Also, the discrepancy in the effects of concerted and 
unilateral interventions is examined. It is argued that to have a larger stabilising effect 
the central bank (or other authority) should coordinate its actions with other market 
participants. Furthermore, intervention policy should be more transparent as the effect 
of it directly depends on the motivation and current state of the market. 
Following this, there is a period of studies mostly restricted to the dollar/yen 
exchange rate. Ito (2002) analyses the effectiveness of interventions using regression 
analysis and a reaction function approach. The paper examines not only the effects of 
the intervention policy on the level or volatility of the respective exchange rate but also 
the profits obtained from capital gains (realised, not realised and interest rate 
differentials). Regarding income, Japanese monetary policy is evaluated as successful 
and aiming to stabilise the market. However, interventions are claimed as being 
effective only in the second part of the 1990s. What is more, unilateral interventions 
independently performed by the Japanese monetary authorities are found to be 
considerably less effective than those coordinated with the US interventions. 
There are also some papers continuing in the analysis of foreign exchange 
interventions. For instance, Hutchison, Fatum (2003) employ event study 
methodology, particularly, non-parametric sign and matched sample tests. Most of the 
studies published in the 2000s are focused on data sample from 1990 to 2000. 
The authors come to the conclusion that sterilised interventions have a stabilising effect 
on the exchange rate in the short run. Regarding large scale interventions coordinated 
with the US Fed, it is again confirmed that they are among the more effective and 
successful ones. Also, there is no necessity to support the intervention policy with an 
appropriate interest rate policy. This paper also focuses on interventions as a “signal” 
tool used by the enabled authorities to communicate to market participants their 
concept of the equilibrium level of the exchange rate. 
According to Nagayasu (2004), foreign exchange interventions performed by 
the BoJ are ineffective if they are not concerted with the Fed. The author employs 
different specifications of the GARCH model, and in the results reported Japanese 
unilateral interventions are statistically insignificant. At the same time, concerted 
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interventions are said to be effective in affecting the level of the exchange rate. What 
is more, interventions have a short-term effect on the movements of the dollar/yen 
exchange rate in the sample period, which lasts only a day. The models which are 
specified in the paper provide evidence for an increasing effect of intervention policy 
on exchange rate volatility. It can be interpreted to mean that interventions lead to 
an increase in the uncertainty of the market. 
In Chaboud and Humpage (2005) concentrated mostly on the short-term 
effectiveness of interventions performed by the BoJ in 1991-2004. The whole sample 
data is barely sufficient to predict shifts in the exchange rate level. But, as has been 
mentioned and demonstrated in previous papers, to be effective Japanese intervention 
should be aligned with the US intervention. The effect of interventions conducted by 
the Japanese authority alone is defined as moderate but detectable with a short run 
effect on the variance of the dollar-yen exchange rate. For the second part of the data 
sample, where interventions are less frequent than in the early 1990s but greater in 
amount, this monetary policy tool is seen to be more successful. 
Beine, Szafarz (2006) examine the impact as well as the effectiveness of foreign 
exchange interventions using standard GARCH (1,1) methodology. According to 
the study results, isolated intervention policy should be carried out on a large scale. 
Otherwise, the desired effects will not be achieved, and in some cases, the exchange 
rate volatility can be adversely affected. As a consequence, it is recommended that 
large-scale intervention policy is applied preferentially by the BoJ. 
The level and volatility of exchange rates is also an object of the paper by 
Watanabe and Harada (2006) based on the means of the component GARCH model. 
The authors use data on the yen/dollar in the sample period of 1991-2003. The study 
reveals opposite effects of intervention: it reduces the volatility in the short-run in the 
second half of the sample, that is, the late 1990s, and has no effect on volatility in 
the first half of the sample. Supplementing what has been stated by previous papers, in 
this second half of the sample the BoJ’s intervention can be seen as successful only in 
cases of policy coordinated with the US Fed. 
Using the classical GARCH approach Hillebrand, Schnabl (2006) study 
the effects which interventions have on the volatility of exchange rates. The data 
sample is similar to that commonly used by the papers of this period – 1991-2004. 
In this case, the GARCH estimates are evaluated by the authors as “inconclusive”. 
Also, some estimates on different reduced samples of data were performed and the 
existence of a “structural break” was confirmed, as around the year 2000, foreign 
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exchange interventions performed by the BoJ remained unsterilized due to the liquidity 
trap. The volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate was increased by intervention policy 
during the whole of the 1990s. But in 1997 the situation changed, and interventions 
stabilised the market. On the other hand, the authors find no evidence of policy shift to 
large-scale interventions from small ones having any significant effect on volatility. 
In 2007 in his paper Beine, using Japanese data tries to find reasons for central 
banks to apply secret foreign exchange interventions. Thus, according to the results 
of his study, the BoJ intervenes secretly when it aims to reduce exchange rate volatility 
or to achieve a certain level of the exchange rate on the market. Furthermore, a noise 
trading strategy has not been demonstrated, which could mean that secret intervention 
are used by the BoJ only to cause fundamental changes in the level or volatility of the 
yen/dollar exchange rate on the market. 
Suardi (2008) employs a double threshold GARCH method to determine 
differences in regimes of the yen/dollar exchange rates. According to the outcomes of 
the study, the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention depends on the current 
regime of the exchange rate. If the intervention is found to be effective, it is successful 
in decreasing the volatility of the exchange rate as well as changing the level of the 
exchange rate, especially if the model specified is non-linear with the exchange rate. 
Interventions are also found to be more effective when yen is massively depreciated 
against dollar. Furthermore, coordinated interventions of the BoJ and the Fed are more 
effective in reducing volatility which is demonstrated by the non-linear threshold 
model. The author indicates important practical applications, such as the necessity of 
agreement between policy makers and market agents on the desired level of the 
exchange rate. Secondly, another crucial factor is the similarity of the expectations of 
market agents on the direction and magnitude of the exchange rate movement needed 
to reach equilibrium. Thirdly, the effect of an intervention can be offset by asymmetric 
responses in exchange rate volatility. 
Fatum (2010) analyses not only the effectiveness of interventions but also 
the distribution channels through which they can influence the level of the exchange 
rate or its volatility. In a time horizon of a day, actual intervention has a strong effect 
on the exchange rate, and it does not matter if market participants were aware of this 
intervention or not. In contrast to some previous papers, the portfolio distribution 
channel is seen to be one with the most considerable influence, while the signalling 
channel cannot be called effective. It is also important to understand what it means for 
market participants “to be aware of the intervention”. The authors come to the 
conclusion that most of the official statements which should provide information about 
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forthcoming interventions are inadequate. As a consequence, the announcement or 
non-announcement of intervention cannot affect the market to any considerable degree. 
Dukich, Kim, and Lin (2010) evaluate the performance of the GARCH models 
for modelling daily changes in logarithmic exchange rates. They consider three 
exchange rate series – pound/dollar, yen/dollar, euro/dollar. For each sequence, the 
authors fit three GARCH models, with varying numbers of parameters, and attempt to 
replicate the empirical sequence via simulation. GARCH (1,1), GARCH (1,2), 
GARCH (2,1) models are used, and then the adequacy of each model is assessed. The 
tests of model adequacy are performed by simulating each GARCH model and 
comparing it to the corresponding empirical sequence. None of the GARCH models 
considered in the analysis captures the empirical nature of the exchange rate series 
particularly well; each model failed to adequately reproduce the sudden shift in 
variability associated with the financial crisis. Moreover, histograms of the residuals 
show mixed results. Residuals for the yen/dollar sequence appear to be slightly heavier-
tailed or skewed left. Thus, while each sequence satisfies the assumptions underlying 
the GARCH model, the GARCH model does not appear to reflect the empirical nature 
of those sequences faithfully. 
Chortareas, Jiang, and Nankervis (2011) analyse the effects of the BoJ 
interventions on exchange rate volatility using data not only on exchange rates 
dollar/yen and euro/yen but also intervention data on a daily and intraday basis. The 
econometrics methods they employ are diverse – multivariate GARCH models, 
quartile plots, and equal variance test. According to the paper volatility of the 
dollar/yen exchange rate is decreased by intervention policy, although in a “very” 
short-term and unstable manner. The spillover effect is also a very important object of 
the study. Thus interventions which decrease volatility on the dollar/yen market 
increase volatility on the euro/yen market. What is more, this revealed impact has a 
whole day effect. The authors also provide information on the effect that foreign 
exchange intervention has on the covariance of exchange rates. This is one of the pieces 
of evidence regarding the spillover effect between two markets – dollar/yen and 
euro/yen markets, which can have practical implications to balance investment 
portfolios. Following this, there are different effects of the intervention on volatility 
depending on varying market conditions. Regarding the heteroskedasticity of the 
intraday returns, the intervention policy of the MoF has positive effects, as it makes 
these returns more homoscedastic. 
MacDonald and Mao (2016) study the yen/dollar exchange rate also by 
separating the whole data sample from 1991 until 2004 into three regimes using the 
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common dividing points – the year 1995 and 2003. The paper is aiming to analyse the 
relations between the foreign exchange interventions, speculation and sentiments and 
exchange rate movements. First, Ito’s findings (2005) are confirmed, and the Japanese 
monetary authorities reacted by the interventions to the sharp appreciation of yen, 
exchange rate volatility and increasing speculation on the appreciation of the national 
currency. It is also pointed out that not only monetary policy plays an important role in 
the dynamic of the exchange rate but also the fundamental factors and market 
conditions. What is more, the authors identify important features of the successful 
monetary policy makers. Thus, for the clear and effective signalling interventions 
should be frequent and constant. Following this, for the effective coordination channel, 
the policy maker should intervene according to the expectations of the market 
participants. Thirdly, in the case of Japan, it is important for the MoF/the BoJ to 
consider “the behaviour and sentiment of currency speculators”, particularly, the 
dynamics of the bond markets. 
Studies of the period after the year 2001 are agreed on the effectiveness of large, 
coordinated and infrequent foreign exchange interventions. In contrast to this, there are 
opposite results for the effect which foreign exchange interventions have on the 
volatility of the exchange rate. The effect of foreign exchange interventions is found to 
be short-run, lasting no longer than one day. In the case of Japan, intervention policy 
cannot be considered as a signalling channel for changes in monetary policy. 
Most of the studies conducted after the year 2001 when the official data on the 
interventions was published use the same data. As a result, the way in which full data 
sample is divided into the subsamples and the employed methodology are the main 
reason for the conflicting outcomes of these papers. 
Thus, all the studies which apply GARCH-like specifications to study the effect 
of the foreign exchange interventions on the dollar/yen exchange rate can be divided 
into two groups – ones, which demonstrate effectiveness, and others, which 
demonstrates ineffectiveness. A more detailed overview is presented in the 
Appendix A. Outcomes also depend on the fact if each intervention regime is 
considered separately or if some of them are taken combined. 
One innovation of this study is that it is supposed to be data were driven which 
means that the data sample is going to be extended until the year 2011. Overview of 
the related literature demonstrates the majority of studies focusing on the period from 
1991 to 2004 when the Japanese monetary authorities intervened the foreign exchange 
market actively. Then a period of silence started when there were no noticeable actions 
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from the side of the BoJ and the Ministry of Finance. It can be identified as a possible 
reason why most of the researchers do not take this period into account when analysing 
intervention policy in Japan and its effect on the level of the dollar/yen exchange rate 
and its volatility. We will make an attempt to include all the available data on the 
interventions in the GARCH-in-mean model which is planned to be used for the 
analysis. The period from 2005 to 2011 (the MoF conducted the last intervention on 
November 4, 2011) is also interesting object to examine as at least two noticeable 
events took place there – financial crisis of 2008 and Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 
in March 2011. If we find no considerable effect of the interventions on the volatility 
under this subsample, then we will try to analyse separate effect of each intervention 
on the level of the exchange rate – if a target was achieved in both short- and long-term 
horizon. 
The second feature of the study is that it focuses on the effectiveness of different 
intervention regimes employed by the Japanese monetary authorities. We run the 
model on the four subsamples to find which intervention technique can be considered 
as the most effective for reducing the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. The 
main purpose is to identify some potential practical implications of the study which 
can be applied by the monetary policy maker mainly targeting to ease the exchange 
rate volatility. 
Another innovation of our study is that we will use a GARCH-in-mean 
modification of the classical GARCH-model. After completing the review of the 
existing empirical studies, we have not found that this type of GARCH-model 
extension has been already used for the analysis of the effect of the foreign exchange 
interventions on the both level and volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
Application of GARCH-in-mean model will allow us to account for the effect of the 
conditional variance on the conditional mean. This is a very important feature of the 
financial assets when the returns heavily depend on the risk. Thus, in case a coefficient 
of the conditional variance in a mean equation will be significant under one or more 
intervention regimes, we will be able to conclude that the level of the exchange rate is 
determined by the volatility than any other external controlling variable, included in 
the equations. 
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3. Data and Methods 
3.1. Data description 
The data on the dollar/yen exchange rate are closing spot prices. 
The observation period is from January 2, 1991, up to December 30, 2011. The choice 
of the data sample is based on the availability of official information on foreign 
exchange intervention operations conducted by the MoF on behalf of the BoJ. 
According to historical data which is currently available in the public domain, the first 
intervention was performed on May 13, 1991, and the last on November 4, 2011. In 
our full data sample, we try to capture all the intervention data. 
 
Figure 3.1: Daily Dollar/Yen Exchange Rate, 1991-2011 
Source: Investing.com. 
The nominal dollar/yen exchange rate does not show either substantial 
appreciation or depreciation. As can be seen from the Figure 3.1 there are certain 
periods of yen appreciation – from 1991 till mid-1995 and from 2007 till the end of the 
sample. At the same time, one can also see certain periods of yen depreciation, which 
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The intervention data sample includes 376 observations. The unit size is 
100 million yen. Foreign exchange interventions by the BoJ can be divided into 
different types according to the pairs of currencies that were bought or sold 
respectively: 
1. US dollar bought, Japanese yen sold; 
2. Japanese yen bought, US dollar sold; 
3. Deutsche Mark bought, US dollar sold; 
4. Deutsche Mark bought, Japanese yen sold; 
5. Indonesian rupiah bought, US dollar sold; 
6. Euro bought, Japanese yen sold. 
Starting from May 13, 1991, till November 4, 2011, the MoF intervened in the 
foreign exchange market 376 times. Almost all the intervention operations relate to the 
pair the dollar/yen of a total amount equalling 74 944,3 billion yen on 351 days with 
an average size of 213,52 billion yen. This volume accounts for 93% of all the 
intervention operations with yen.  
As operations on Deutsche mark and Indonesian rupiah cannot be recognised 
as a systematic approach by the BoJ, we concentrate only on those foreign exchange 
interventions triggering dollar/yen exchange rate and euro/yen exchange rate as the 
source of spillover effect between two markets. Out of 5 473 trading days, the MoF 
reports 351 “dollar” intervention days – 319 dollar purchases and 32 dollar sales. 
Table 3.1: Overview of Japanese Foreign Exchange Interventions, May 1991 – 
November 2011 
















319 32 18 
Average size, 
100 million 
2 502,31 1 524,81 597,39 
As proposed by Ito (2003; 2007) the period from 1991 till 2004 is divided into 
three regimes. Two dividing points can be identified according to board changes which 
relate to policy makers. Thus Eisuke Sakakibara took office as Director-General of the 
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MoF’s International Finance Bureau in June 1995 and Zenbei Mizoguchi as Vice-
Minister of Finance for International Affairs in January 2003. 
Figure 3.2 represents differences between the intervention regimes mentioned 
above. 
1. January 2, 1991 – May 31, 1995: frequent small-scale interventions (first 
regime); 
2. June 1, 1995 – December 31, 2002: infrequent large-scale interventions 
(second regime); 
3. January 1, 2003 – March 31, 2004: frequent large-scale interventions (third 
regime). 
 
Figure 3.2: Absolute Foreign Exchange Interventions, 1991 – 2004 
Source: the MoF. 
The remaining part of the full data sample from April 1, 2004, till December 30, 
2011, is treated as a fourth regime although this time frame is not included in most of 
the studies published after 2010, as this data is affected by the consequences of the 
financial crisis. 
From Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we can observe that the purchase of the yen occurred 
during periods of its depreciation, sales - during periods of its strengthening. There 
were also points when there were sales of the yen against the background of its 
depreciation; this suggests that the BoJ conducted interventions to retain or even 
accelerate the emerging dynamics of the course. In general, the periods of the sale of 
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characteristically distinguished against this pattern. The last years of the sample: the 
largest in the history of the 1990s currency interventions occur against the background 
of the strengthening of the yen, and there is no change in this trend, suggesting whether 
the use of this tool is effective at all. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate one more interesting feature of the movement of 
the yen. Fluctuations of the course throughout the considered gap occur around the 
average value (about 115 yen per dollar) with the tendency of damping of the 
oscillations towards the end of the sample. This trend may mean that the market, in the 
long run, seeks to establish some, say, its equilibrium, the level of the price of the yen. 
This fact can be useful when choosing a yen rate movement model, for example, an 
error correction model with control parameters in the form of currency interventions 
can be constructed. 
According to Takagi (2014) intervention policy in Japan has not been created 
by the BoJ as a monetary authority. The intervention decisions are said to be made “by 
a small group of MOF officials that includes the Minister of Finance, the Vice Minister 
for International Affairs, the Director-General of the International Bureau (…), and 
several other line officers”. Thus, the BoJ is just executing transmitted decisions, and 
its role is not crucial. It cannot be said that Japanese intervention policy is the product 
of the BoJ alone, it is correct to consider it as a joint activity of the MoF and the BoJ. 
A shift from the first to the second regime is observed after the appointment of 
Sakakibara as Director General on June 21, 1995, when the technique changed from 
small and frequent operations to less frequent but greater ones. The aim was to keep 
the dollar/yen exchange rate at a certain level, and this considerable change in 
intervention policy was considered as a possible channel to “surprise” market agents. 
In 2003 there came the regime of the “great intervention” (Taylor, 2006) after 
Mizoguchi started as Vice Minister on January 14, 2003. The yen was appreciating 
while the Japanese economy was in the so-called “deflation trap” (Mizoguchi, 2004) 
so according to the information provided by the Ministry of Finance over a short period 
from January 2003 to March 2004, 35 trillion yen were sold to weaken the Japanese 
national currency. These operations were supported by the simultaneous expansion of 
the monetary base by 15 trillion yen, which makes it possible to consider them as 
“partially unsterilized”. 
According to Ito (2004), there are two most important reasons for the monetary 
authorities to conduct intervention actions. The first one is a sharp appreciation or 
depreciation and the second one is a deviation from the long-term trend. On the other 
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hand, after January 2003 there were a great number of intervention operations which 
cannot be explained by these traditional reasons. Ito provides three other possible 
causes: 
 preventing “premature” appreciation; 
 purchasing foreign bonds as a means of expanding the monetary base; 
 preventing speculative forces from moving the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
The active period of the foreign exchange interventions in Japan was lasting 
until March 2004. In recent years, Japanese monetary authorities intervened only 
several times between September 15, 2010, and November 4, 2011, aiming to prevent 
the sharp appreciation of yen and its nontrivial volatility which were the consequences 
of Great East Japan earthquake in March 2011 (Bordo et al., 2012). 
Appendix B represents comparison of the different intervention techniques for 
every regime separately with the level of the exchange rate and volatility. As a measure 
of volatility, we use the standard deviation of the daily logarithmic returns and there is 
no obvious simple relationship between volatility and interventions operations. 
Table 3.2: Basic statistics of dollar/yen exchange rate 
Statistic Full data 
sample 
Regime I Regime II Regime III Regime IV 
Number of 
observations 
5 473 1 150 1 973 326 2 024 
Mean 110.93 116.04 116.67 114.16 101.91 
Standard 
deviation 
14.57 15.27 11.17 5.34 13.62 
Minimum 75.82 80.65 84.00 104.30 75.82 
Maximum 147.26 141.55 147.26 121.46 123.87 
Coefficient 
of variation 
13.13 13.16 9.57 4.68 13.36 
Start 02.01.1991 02.01.1991 01.06.1995 01.01.2003 01.04.2004 
End 30.12.2011 31.05.1995 31.12.2002 31.03.2004 30.12.2011 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics of the dollar/yen exchange rate during 
the observation period. Following Fidrmuc and Horvath (2008) and using the 
coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean of the individual 
currency) it is possible to come to the conclusion that the Japanese yen is not a very 
stable currency. According to Fidrmuc and Horvath currencies which have a coefficient 
of variation of less than ten are characterised to be the most stable. 
As the purpose of the study is to examine the volatility of the dollar/yen 
exchange rate using GARCH type models, we have to test whether our dataset is 
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stationary or not. As can be seen from Figure 3.1 it appears that the time-series are not 
stationary. We also use the autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation 
function, and the ACF declines towards zero at a slow rate in time. The Portmanteau 
statistic is 182,503.7940 (0.0000), so we reject 𝐻0of Portmanteau test that the 
AC coefficients are jointly insignificant. Then we can test the stationarity of the process 
with two unit root tests - Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF test) and the KPSS test. 
1. The ADF test is based on models of the form: 





In this model the pair of hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜑 = 0 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝐻1: 𝜑 < 0 (3.2) 
 
are tested based on the t-statistic of the coefficient φ from an OLS estimation 
of (2.1). 𝐻0is rejected if the t-statistic is smaller than the relevant critical value. If φ=0 
(that is, under 𝐻0) the series 𝑦𝑡 has a unit root and is non-stationary, whereas it is 
regarded as stationary if the null hypothesis is rejected. 
2. The KPSS test is based on the null hypothesis of stationarity, and it is rejected 
for large values of KPSS statistics. 
Table 3.3: Unit root tests of the time series on the daily dollar/yen exchange rate 
 ADF test 
t-statistic (5% critical 
value) 
KPSS test 
t-statistic (5% critical 
value) 
Full data sample -1.2252 (-1.94) 47.2876 (0.463) 
1st regime -2.0662 (-1.94) 36.2304 (0.463) 
2nd regime 0.5435 (-1.94) 11.9981 (0.463) 
3rd regime -1.4802 (-1.94) 9.3036 (0.463) 
Remained sample -1.0106 (-1.94) 52.1021 (0.463) 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for the augmented 
Dickey and Fuller test if the t-statistic is greater than the critical value at 5% confidence 
level. But at the same time, we should reject the null hypothesis of stationarity for the 
KPSS test if the t-statistic is greater than the critical value. So, from Table 3.3 we can 
say that our full data sample, as well as four subsamples of the dollar/yen exchange 
rates, is non-stationary. There is a deviation in the first regime where the t-statistic is 
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smaller than the critical value, but the stationarity of this subsample is not confirmed 
by the value of the t-statistic from the KPSS test as well as by the time series plot and 
partial autocorrelation function. 
Because we can apply GARCH models only to stationary processes, we have 
to transform the daily dollar/yen exchange rate using the logarithm of the first 
differences. According to Strong (1992) “there are both theoretical and empirical 
reasons for preferring logarithmic returns. Theoretically, logarithmic returns are 
analytically more tractable when linking together sub-period returns to form returns 
over the long intervals. Empirically, logarithmic returns are more likely to be normally 
distributed and so conform to the assumptions of the standard statistical techniques.” 
If 𝑥𝑡 is the exchange rate at time t, we transform the sequence the of exchange rate as 
follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = log (
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑡−1
) = log 𝑥𝑡 − log 𝑥𝑡−1 (2.3) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is known as the log difference of 𝑥𝑡 at time t. 
Having transformed the time-series, we can test it for stationarity using the 
same tests – ADF and KPSS. 
Table 3.4: Unit root tests of the time series on the daily dollar/yen exchange 
returns 
 ADF test 
t-statistic (5% critical 
value) 
KPSS test 
t-statistic (5% critical 
value) 
Full data sample -43.6424 (-1.94) 0.1087 (0.463) 
Regime I -21.4762 (-1.94) 0.1351 (0.463) 
Regime II -25.4519 (-1.94) 0.2918 (0.463) 
Regime III -9.1082 (-1.94) 0.1365 (0.463) 
Regime IV -26.7115 (-1.94) 0.2436 (0.463) 
Table 3.4 confirms the fact that the transformed time series of the full sample, 
as well as four subsamples, are now stationary and there are no unit roots. 
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Table 3.5: Basic statistics of the daily dollar/yen returns 












5 473 1 150 1 973 326 2 024 
Mean -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 
Standard 
deviation 
0.0071 0.0067 0.0075 0.0051 0.0071 
Kurtosis 5.0129 3.4128 6.5202 0.8359 0.0640 
Skewness 0.1217 -0.2740 -0.7648 0.1168 0.0885 
Minimum -0.0695 -0.0337 -0.0695 -0.0161 -0.0363 
Maximum 0.0522 0.0406 0.0380 0.0176 0.0522 
Range 0.1217 0.0743 0.1075 0.0337 0.0885 
Start 02.01.1991 02.01.1991 01.06.1995 01.01.2003 01.04.2004 
End 30.12.2011 31.05.1995 31.12.2002 31.03.2004 30.12.2011 
Table 3.5 presents the descriptive statistics of daily returns dollar/yen for the 
whole data sample as well as four intervention regimes. The mean values of returns are 
very close to zero while the standard deviation is approximately 0.007 with 
insignificant differences. Second intervention regime can be considered as the most 
volatile one as it has the highest standard deviation level. 
For our analysis, we also include external independent variables in the mean 
equation and the variance equation to estimate the effect of the interventions on the 
level of the exchange rate and its volatility respectively. 
Two most important variables are the interventions which were conducted by 
the BoJ during the examining data sample. For the analysis, we divide them into two 
groups: 
 interventions which were aiming to appreciate yen, it means that the BoJ 
bought Japanese yens and sold the US dollars; 
 interventions which were aiming to depreciate yen, it means that the BoJ 
sold Japanese yens and bought the US dollar. 
Unlike other instruments of monetary and monetary policy, data on which are 
published on a regular basis in almost all countries, the information on the currency 
interventions of the BoJ was closed until 2004. It should be noted that even now not 
all countries publish the relevant statistics: The Fed and the US Treasury, the Bank of 
Canada, the MoF are examples of the openness of the actions of monetary authorities. 
Data for intervention in Japan, USA were available for this study. 
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In general, the BoJ directed interventions against the strengthening of the yen. 
First, the interventions of the early 1990s were significantly smaller regarding the 
volume of interventions in the late 1990s, and secondly, except certain periods of 
intervention, are clustered; thirdly, Appendix B clearly shows the variability in the 
variance over time, which is characteristic for financial variables. 
Table 3.6: Basic statistics of the “depreciating” interventions 
Statistic Full data 
sample 








319 139 43 129 8 
Mean 2,502.31 501.77 4,964.95 2,719.21 20,527.50 
Standard 
deviation 
5,838.82 438.78 3,523.96 3,010.68 28,555.18 
Kurtosis 110.03 14.19 0.57 4.72 2.29 
Skewness 9.15 2.96 0.90 2.06 1.70 
Minimum 1.00 51.00 430.00 1.00 2,028.00 
Maximum 80,722.00 3,388.00 14,059.00 16,664.00 80,772.00 
Following Hillebrand and Schnabl (2006) to control for disturbances in other 
asset markets, we include daily log returns of Japanese and US stock indices, the 
Nikkei 225 for Japan and the Dow Jones Industrial Average for the US, both provided 
by Yahoo!Finance. The US foreign exchange intervention data are provided by the 
Federal Reserve Board and are sub-divided into yen, mark, and other currencies 
purchased or sold. Following the same logic as we do for the case of the foreign 
exchange interventions conducted by the BoJ we include only 23 intervention 
operations which affect Japanese yen in our data sample. 
Our analysis is data driven, so we synchronise all the data with the dates on 
which the information on the dollar/yen exchange rate is available. For the appreciating 
interventions, we use negative values of the Japanese yen bought as the BoJ has 
extracted this volume of money from the economy. Contrary to this for the depreciating 
interventions, we use positive values of the Japanese yen sold as the BoJ has injected 
this amount of money to the economy. If there was no intervention on a certain date, 
then we took the value of zero as the official data are available on the webpage of the 
Ministry of Finance of Japan. For the missing data in the Nikkei and Dow Jones 
indices, we use the data available for the previous day following Cooper and 
Finkelstein (2016). 
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3.2. Model description 
The efficiency of the foreign exchange interventions can be considered as: 
 the possibility to have any effect on the dynamics of the level of the 
exchange rate expressed in certain quantitative units; 
 the possibility to influence the stability of the currency market 
expressed in certain quantitative units. 
The reason for choosing these criteria of effectiveness is based on the 
arguments that the monetary authorities give in favour of interventions. If interventions 
are effective, the monetary authorities use these instruments reasonably; otherwise, it 
is either waste of resources or an attempt to make money by currency speculation under 
the guise of certain political promises. 
According to Dominguez (1998), interventions can be recognised as the 
successful one if the volatility is reduced and the volatility is determined by squared 
returns. 
The choice of the GARCH-in-mean model is also motivated by the fact that in 
the case of the risk of the financial asset and the expected return are correlated. To 
account for this relationship, it makes sense to include in the mean equation the 
conditional estimated variance. As a result, we are aiming to investigate not only how 
both the level of the exchange rate and the volatility are affected by the foreign 
exchange interventions but also how the risk influences the return. It will also help to 
control for one more variable in the mean equation. 
After the preliminary investigation of the full data sample and all the four data 
subsamples, we can initiate the actual estimation of the parameters of the GARCH-in-
mean model for the full data sample as well as subsamples. The GARCH-in-mean 
model was introduced and developed by Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987), it is based 
on the GARCH(1,1) model introduced by Bollerslev (1986, pp. 307-327), and it 
consists of two equations, one for the mean and another one for the variance of the time 
series. 
As it has been stated in the Data Description section, Japanese intervention 
policy has been concentrated mainly on the dollar/yen currency market. 93.35% of 
interventions (regarding a number of operations) is against US dollar, so all the other 
exchange rates coupled with yen are excluded from the model specification. 
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The specification the ARCH-in-mean model allows the mean of a time series 
to depend on its own conditional variance. This type of model is defined as a very 
useful one in modelling asset returns. According to the theory of optimal portfolio 
choice, the mean of a risky asset return should depend on its variance. A simple AR(1) 
– ARCH(1)-in-mean model can be written as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿ℎ𝑡 + 𝑡 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡−1[ 𝑡
2] = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑡−𝑖
2  
(3.3) 
An ARMA – GARCH generalisation of this simple model is also possible. 
For analysis, we will use a variation of this extension, and the model takes the 
following form: 
∆𝑠𝑖 = 𝜇 + 𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑚 ∙ 𝜎𝑖
2 + 𝑖 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖 + 𝑠 ∙ 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 
+𝑐 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝑛 ∙ 𝑁𝐼𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐼𝑖 + 𝑑 ∙ 𝐷𝑂𝑊 𝐽𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑖 
 
𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑖−1
2 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝜎𝑖−1
2 + 𝛾 ∙ ln 𝜎𝑖−1
2 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖 + 𝑠 ∙ 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 
𝑐 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝑛 ∙ 𝑁𝐼𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐼𝑖 + 𝑑 ∙ 𝐷𝑂𝑊 𝐽𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑖 
(3.4) 
where ∆𝑠𝑖 is the difference of the log of the exchange rate between time t and 
t-1 (exchange rate over two consecutive trading days); 
the conditional variance in the mean equation (𝜎𝑖
2) allows for the effect of the 
observed volatility on the level of the exchange rate; 
𝑖 are the residuals; 
BUYi are the interventions which the BoJ conducted aiming to appreciate yen, 
so it bought Japanese yens and sold US dollars; 
SELLi are the interventions which the BoJ conducted aiming to depreciate yen, 
so it sold Japanese yens and bought US dollars; 
COORDINATIONi is a dummy variable which reflects the fact if at the same 
trading day there was an intervention conducted by US Fed to support a monetary 
policy of the BoJ. In case an operation took place, COORDINATIONi equals 1, 
otherwise – 0. 
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NIKKEIi is daily log returns of the of the Nikkei 225, a stock market index for 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). This variable is included in the model to account for 
the situation on the Japanese stock market as well as for the economic situation in Japan 
on the whole. 
DOW JONESi are daily log returns of Dow Jones Industrial Average, and it is 
included in the model to account for the situation on the American stock market as 
Japanese economy depends in many ways on the export of goods to the United States. 
The initial GARCH model implies non-negativity of the values of the included 
variables. Thus, this formulation automatically involves the insignificance of the 
direction (sign) of intervention for the stability of the currency market, which may be 
incorrect. In GARCH theory, this possibility was taken into account by developing an 
exponential model of E-GARCH, where, firstly, the non-negativity of the vector of 
exogenous variables is no longer required, and, secondly, the asymmetry of the 
residuals is taken into account. 
Various ARIMA models were fitted to the data and the one with the lowest BIC 
selected (results are presented in Appendix C). Using the residuals of the ARIMA 
models of the most suitable order respectively for every intervention regime we then 
test for ARCH effects. Because of the small p-values we can reject the null hypothesis 
and conclude that there are ARCH effects, thereby justifying the of the GARCH-type 
models. 
Table 3.7: Results of Box-Ljung test for ARCH effect in residuals 
 Regime I Regime II Regime III Regime IV 
Chi-squared 39.3 119.93 13.262 574.04 
df 12 12 12 12 
p-value 9.391e-05 <2.2e-16 0.3503 <2.2e-16 
As it can be seen from the Table 3.7 p-value is rather high for the Regime III 
so for this subsample we will regress the returns on the error term assuming that the 
exchange rate follows a random walk. 
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4. Discussion of the results 
In February of 1973, the floating exchange regime was set up in Japan, and 
immediately after this Japanese economy faced the substantial fluctuations of the level 
of the exchange rate and formation of the long-term increasing trend yen to 
the US dollar and other European currencies. For levelling out the negative influence 
of the exchange rate fluctuations on the economy the BoJ started to carry out foreign 
exchange interventions, and information on this used to appear in media from time to 
time. According to the law about “The Bank of Japan” the foreign exchange 
interventions should be conducted for stabilisation of the level of the exchange rate, 
and they should be planned for the long-term period. Quite often there can be sharp 
fluctuations of the exchange rate on the currency market, which may have adverse 
consequences for the economy, and in this case, the particular unit of the BoJ is 
urgently associated with the MoF and conducts emergency interventions. 
For stimulation of the Japanese economy, the BoJ adhered to the strategy of the 
“cheap” yen, which allowed to increase the volume of export and restrain the growth 
of import, what, undoubtedly, had a positive effect on the trade balance and GDP of 
Japan. From the year 2000 till 2010 Japan used to have positive trade balance, meaning 
that export had been dominating import considerably. From the year 2000 to 2007 trade 
balance increased by 76.39%, resulting in 4.889% of GDP in 2007 contrary to 2.56% 
in 2000. These data demonstrate the significant role of exports in the formation of GDP, 
and the depreciation of yen contributed a lot to that. During the period from 2008 till 
2010 the real yen exchange rate against the US dollar decreased by 14.62%. 
The beginning of the crisis was marked by a fall in the rates of almost all the world 
currencies, except the yen, which for the period from September 2008 to September 
2010 increased by 22%. The strengthening of the yen was smooth and systematic, with 
rare attempts to reverse the trend in March-April 2009 and April-May 2010. 
Foreign investors perceive the Japanese economy as more stable than the 
US economy. Also, the current account surplus and the inflow of foreign capital due to 
a stable percentage differential for assets denominated in the yen contributes to the 
appreciation of the Japanese currency against euro and the US dollar. 
There can be both positive and negative consequences of appreciation of the 
national currency (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Consequences of appreciation of the national currency 
Positive features of the Japanese yen’s 
appreciation 
Negative features of the Japanese yen’s 
appreciation 
1. The slowdown in the growth of prices 
for goods and fuel. 
1. The growth of imports. 
2. Reorientation of exporting companies 
to domestic demand. 
2. Reduction in the volume of exports of 
goods and technology, as a result - a 
reduction in GDP growth. 
3. Optimisation of costs by exporting 
companies to reduce losses. 
3. Reducing the profits of export 
corporations when they are received 
from abroad. 
4. Reduction of the interest rate for 
correcting the difference for foreign 
assets, as well as for increasing 
consumer and investment costs. 
4. Decreased competitiveness of goods 
in foreign markets (loss of markets). 
5. The inflow of short-term foreign 
capital. 
5. High risks of currency volatility due 
to the excessive inflow of speculative 
foreign capital. 
 6. Transfer of production to countries 
with weak currencies. 
With the onset of the crisis in 2008, the current account balance decreased by 
25.53%, and this trend continued in the following years. 
According to Yasu and Shiraki (2010) in 2010 the share of foreign trade in the 
GDP structure has decreased to a minimum since 2002. Significant losses are borne by 
Japanese exporting manufacturers. Sony Corporation, which receives 70% of revenues 
outside of Japan, loses about 7 billion yen of operating profit annually due to 
the appreciation of the yen against the euro and 2 billion yen due to the weakening of 
the dollar against the Japanese currency. Over the years 2010-2011, Sony has closed 
11 plants abroad, 20,000 jobs have been cut. Panasonic reduced nearly 30,000 jobs in 
2010-2011 to minimise costs. Obviously, for the Japanese economy, strengthening the 
yen’s exchange rate is a significant problem, so changing the trend is a priority goal 
for the economy to exit the recession. 
At the same time, there are opponents of the depreciation of the yen. The main 
ones are Japan’s trading partners: USA, EU, China, as well as competitors. Thus, in 
the United States in the period from 2000 to 2007, there was a significant deterioration 
in the current account balance - the negative balance increased by 74%. With the onset 
of the crisis, the situation began to improve radically, and from 2007 to 2010, 
the negative balance decreased by 33%. 
One of the reasons for the positive dynamics of the current account is 
the depreciation of the US dollar against the currencies of its main trading partners, 
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which makes export goods more attractive to buyers abroad, and reduces imports of 
goods and services. 
Corporations from China, South Korea, EU countries, USA are also not 
interested in the changing of the situation in the Japanese foreign exchange market as 
they are competitors of Japanese manufacturers of electronic home appliances, gadgets, 
cars, and other goods. 
In August 2010, the BoJ took monetary measures to combat the growing value 
of the yen. They were aimed at increasing liquidity in the money market. The BoJ 
announced an increase in lending to commercial banks by 10 trillion yens 
(117 billion US dollars), as well as 30 trillion yens, will be directed to the program of 
affordable lending to households and the business sector. Also, the government of 
Japan announced a package of incentive measures amounting to 920 billion yens. 
All these measures in aggregate were to increase the yen’s offer in the market and 
create prerequisites for reducing its rate. 
However, the market participants, unfortunately, did not react positively 
to these measures, and in almost a week the US dollar to yen rate reached a 15-
year low, falling below the 83 mark. 
All this has pushed the BoJ to more decisive measures - currency interventions. 
The countries of the European Union, the United States, Great Britain and Switzerland 
were notified in advance of the alleged actions. Using a proven “rumours” strategy, 
rumours of interventions from the beginning of September 2010 were launched. The 
intervention was conducted on September 15, 2010. The BoJ spent 23 billion dollars 
on foreign exchange operations, which is an insignificant part of the country’s official 
reserves, which On July 1, 2010, there were 1,063,513 dollars. 
In the short-term period, the goal of the intervention was not achieved, and the 
trend was not broken. This is not surprising since the BoJ is opposed by very strong 
opponents - not only the central banks of other states (not interested in depreciating the 
yen) but also speculators who can make good money in “muddy water”. 
The data from Appendix D show the values from the β1, α, β and γ coefficients 
of GARCH-in-mean model for all the four regimes. It is important to mention that in 
all our estimates of the model we used the hypothesis that the errors are distributed 
according to Generalised error distribution. There are several conclusions that can be 
drawn from this table. 
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First, we can observe that the estimated coefficients of the model respect 
the requirement that (α+β) <1, which is a crucial condition for a mean reverting 
process. This enables us to conclude that conditional volatilities are mean reverting 
for all the four intervention regimes. 
According to Kočenda and Černý (2015), the sum of both coefficients also tells 
us about the speed of convergence of the forecast of the conditional volatility to 
a steady state: the closer to one its value is, the slower the convergence. As we can 
observe it from the Appendix D under the second regime α+β=0,96 which is the highest 
value among all the other regimes and demonstrates the slowest convergence to the 
steady state. Under the third regime we have a sum of α and β of 0,75, so during this 
period, the conditional variance was approaching its steady level with the higher speed 
than under both second and fourth regimes. 
Second, we can observe that the estimated coefficients for the variance equation 
of the model (the α, β and γ coefficients) are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level only for the fourth intervention regime. For the first regime, 
the volatility is affected only by the logarithm of the lagged volatility which is also true 
for the second regime. For the second and the third intervention regimes, β coefficients 
are significant so we can conclude that only the lagged volatility affects the current 
volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
The third conclusion is that the archm coefficient β1 for the variance term in the 
mean equation is statistically significant only for the first intervention regime. This can 
potentially invalidate the initial hypothesis that there is a correlation between risk and 
expected return. 
For interpretation of α and β coefficients, we will follow Kočenda and Černý 
(2015). Coefficient α reflects the impact of “news” of “surprises” from previous 
periods that affects the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate: a significant and 
positive α less than one depicts the extent of the shocks’ effect on volatility, which is 
not destabilising. When α is greater than one then shocks materialising in the past are 
destabilising. According to our results, coefficient α is significant only under the fourth 
regime which leads us to the conclusion that under all the other regimes “news” and 
“surprises” from the previous day do not influence the current conditional volatility of 
the dollar/yen exchange rate. Thus, although under the first and second regime 
depreciating interventions have a considerable effect on the conditional volatility, 
changes in the volatility in preceding days, also caused by the intervention operations, 
were not able to increase or decrease volatility on the following day. Under the fourth 
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regime coefficient α has a negative value (-0.05), so we cannot determine 
unequivocally whether shocks do have or do not have a destabilising effect on the 
volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
The GARCH term β, on the other hand, measures the impact of the forecast 
variance from previous periods of the current conditional variance, or volatility. 
A significant coefficient β (close to one) thus means a high degree of persistence in 
volatility. Contrary to the results that we have obtained for the estimated coefficient α, 
GARCH term β is significant, positive and less than one for the second, third and fourth 
regimes. It means that persistence in volatility plays the major role in the determination 
of the current level of the conditional variance for these three subsamples. 
We can observe that depending on the type of the intervention regime different 
external independent variables have an effect on the level of the exchange rate. Thus, 
for the first regime which is characterised with infrequent and small scale interventions 
the level of the dollar/yen exchange rate is affected with conducting interventions 
targeting to depreciate yen (selling yens, buying US dollars), coordinated of the 
operations with US Fed and alteration of both Nikkei and Dow Jones indices. At the 
same time, the value of the estimated coefficient for “sell interventions” is so tiny so 
this external variable cannot be taken into account as a factor which determines the 
level of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
For the second regime, it is observable that level of the exchange rate is mostly 
affected by the situation on the US market as there are two significant regressors – 
interventions conducted at the same time by the US Fed and changing of the Dow Jones 
index. We can see that both estimates are positive, so it leads us to the conclusion that 
the growth of the US market results in an appreciation of yen as well as coordinated 
interventions augments the level of the dollar/yen exchange rate. As it is defined by the 
investigation of the first regime Nikkei index is also a significant external variable that 
also has negative value, which demonstrates that growth of the market decreases the 
level of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
Since BoJ had not conducted interventions which were targeting in appreciation 
of yen during third and fourth subsamples as well as there was no operation coordinated 
with US Fed we have excluded those two variables from the analysis. The third regime 
which is predicted to be the most efficient one regarding influencing the level of the 
exchange rate because of the frequent interventions of the great scale does not appear 
to support this prediction. As we can observe from the Appendix D there is no 
significant external variable affecting the level of the dollar/yen exchange rate. It is 
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important to mark that the value of the Nikkei coefficient is very close for the one from 
the third regime, in both cases values are negative. 
We cannot call the fourth regime as a “regime” in a way that we used to do it 
with the three other ones because there was no chain of logical operations following 
each other on the entire data subsample. As a consequence, estimation results provide 
us with only two significant independent variables and one of them is daily log returns 
of stock market index – Dow Jones. Although depreciating interventions seem to be a 
significant factor by its value is zero. 
According to the generalised results of relevant studies conducted by various 
economists after the year 2001 foreign exchange interventions of the BoJ are 
recognised as the effective ones for the second and third regimes when they are 
considered both separately and combined, as well as the for the entire data sample. 
On the other hand, under the first and the second regimes only coordinated 
interventions were effective. Our results partly support these outcomes. First, under 
both the first and the second regimes dummy variable for coordination of Japanese 
interventions with US Fed is significant and has positive value so we can conclude that 
only coordinated interventions were effective regarding changing the level of the 
dollar/yen exchange rate. At the same time, depreciating interventions (purchases of 
yens) were able to influence the level of the exchange rate under the first regime 
although the value of the coefficient is very tiny. This outcome also supports the 
general conclusion that yen sales are found to be more effective that the yen purchases 
regarding the effect on the level of the exchange rate. 
There are some studies where the first regime was also recognised as the 
effective one for the alteration of the exchange rate level. Thus, for example, Ito (2003, 
2005, 2007), as well as Watanabe and Harada (2006), have found both the first and the 
second intervention regimes to be successful in having an effect on the dollar/yen 
exchange rate, and the US interventions were more powerful that the Japanese 
unilateral interventions. 
While the third regime was found to be successful for many types of research, 
we have the opposite result. In our model specification, the current level of the 
exchange rate is not affected by the external variables such as some the interventions 
or their coordination with the US Fed but by the conditional variance. The volatility of 
the exchange rate can be treated as a more important factor for the conditional mean 
that any other external regressor. When we include the conditional variance in the mean 
equation, we have started to control for the effect of the disturbance on the exchange 
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rate of yen against the US dollar, and at the same time, the other variables such as 
foreign exchange interventions have decreased their influence. There were no 
coordinated interventions under the last two regimes so we can conclude that 
the efficiency of the Japanese interventions was also reduced by their isolation. 
There is also one important feature of the Japanese foreign exchange 
interventions – duration of their live time horizon. There can be a different way to solve 
the problem of simultaneity between intervention and exchange rate. Thus, Beine 
(2004) used dummy variables for lagged Japanese and US interventions for the period 
from April 1991 till October 2001. According to his results, the effect of the foreign 
exchange intervention is daily only, so the effective level of the exchange rate is 
determined by the current market conditions. Short-lived effect of interventions is also 
supported by the study of Beine et al. (2003) on the weekly exchange rate. The lagged 
intervention frequency did not affect the level of the exchange rate under the first 
intervention regime. In their studies, Kim (2007) and Kim and Le (2010) use intra-
daily data to examine whether interventions have an effect which lasts longer than 
several hours or whether all the influence is dissolved during one trading day, and the 
short live impact is confirmed. 
Further, we will discuss the results of our analysis of the effect of the foreign 
exchange interventions on the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. Here we can 
observe a different situation (Appendix D), so the interventions influence the level and 
volatility of the exchange rate in various ways. 
Interventions which are appreciating yen do not influence volatility as 
estimated coefficients are very small and not significant. On the other hand, 
depreciating interventions are found to be efficient for both the first and the second 
regimes, although the estimated coefficient is also slight and have a different sign 
(0.001 and -0.00003 respectively). We can observe a negative dependency between 
the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate and the depreciating interventions, which 
can be interpreted as the scenario that every 100 million of yen that have been sold 
decrease the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate by 0.00003 during the second 
regime. Contrary to the second regime infrequent depreciating interventions of the 
small scale tend to increase the volatility so in this way this policy cannot be claimed 
as the effective one. For both the first and second regimes coordinated interventions 
conducted by the US Fed have an increasing effect on the volatility of the dollar/yen 
exchange rate. Regarding the Nikkei 225 index, we can conclude that it has no 
considerable influence on the volatility for all the subsamples while estimated 
coefficient of the Dow Jones index is significant for the second and the third regime. 
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Thus, there is significant influence detected of individual interventions of 
the BoJ on market stability from the year 1995 till 2002. This fact can be interpreted 
as an indication that the monetary authorities of Japan were able to stabilise the market 
by their actions. This fact supports one of the arguments that usually lead to 
intervention: the monetary authorities tend to stabilise the market. 
As for the US Fed interventions, the results are as follows: for the first and 
the second regime, a relationship between the movement of the exchange rate and 
interventions was statistically significant and with a right sign. There is also 
a statistically significant dependency between the intervention and market dispersion, 
with a positive sign. The possible reason for this is that the US monetary authorities 
have more confidence among market participants than the monetary authorities of 
Japan, and the corresponding actions on their part in most cases lead to a definite result. 
Unfortunately, about the foreign exchange market, the US Fed’s actions have 
a negative effect: the positive sign of the coordination coefficient in the equation of 
variation means that the Fed “shakes the boat”. Given this fact, the real failure of 
the US monetary authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange market (in 1998, 
the last US intervention in respect of the yen was observed) may seem entirely 
reasonable. 
In our study, we have conflicting results about the effect of the foreign 
exchange interventions on the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
1. 02.01.1991 – 31.05.1995: infrequent interventions of the small scale – 
positive effect on the volatility; 
2. 01.06.1995 – 31.12.2002: frequent interventions of the small scale – 
negative effect on the volatility; 
3. 01.01.2003 – 31.03.2004: frequent interventions of the great scale – 
no effect on the volatility; 
4. 01.04.2004 – 30.12.2011: a single sequence of interventions in 2011 – 
no effect on the volatility. 
As it has been stated above studies which were conducted on the same data 
sample as we use and also employing GARCH-like specifications demonstrate mixed 
results on the influence of the foreign exchange interventions on the volatility. Thus, 
Nagayasu (2004), Kim and Sheen (2006), who examine the effect on the volatility 
caused by interventions by the joint estimation of conditional variance and conditional 
mean, have found a positive relationship between these two variables on the full data 
sample from 1991 till 2004. 
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But in our study, we are more interested not in estimating the effect on the entire 
data sample but rather in the different sample periods or types of intervention policy. 
In their studies, Beine (2004), Hillebrand and Schnable (2006), Kim (2007), Kim and 
Le (2010), Hassan (2012) support our main findings of the first intervention regime 
that there is the positive (increasing) effect on the volatility caused by interventions. 
There are also other factors which the one should take into account: 
1. Interventions should be public and coordinated. And as we can see from our 
output operations coordinated with the US Fed during the first regime also 
have a significant effect on the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
In their study, Kim and Le (2010) demonstrate with the GARCH-like 
specification that secret interventions have a negative (decreasing) effect on 
the volatility, while public interventions, especially during Tokyo trading, 
still have a tendency to increase the conditional variance of the dollar/yen 
exchange rate. Hassan (2012) have found some evidence of negative 
intervention effect on the volatility during the first regime, but it is true only 
for unilateral sales of yen without coordination with Fed. 
2. Interventions should be conducted during Tokyo trading. 
As the main finding for the first intervention regime which lasted from 1991 
until May 1995 and is characterized with infrequent interventions of the small scale, 
we can conclude that depreciating operations of selling yen and buying US dollars 
which were coordinated with US Fed have positive, means increasing effect on the 
volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
Watanabe and Harada (2006) who also used GARCH-like specification in their 
paper estimated a system of three, not two, equations to account for their hypothesis 
that volatility consists of both short-term and long-term components. According 
to their results for the first regime, there is no impact of interventions on the long-term 
volatility while the effect is negative for the short-term conditional variance for not 
coordinated interventions. Hassan (2012) supports the absence of any relationship 
between the interventions and the volatility only for not coordinated appreciating 
interventions. 
According to the results of the second regime which lasted from June 1995 until 
the end of the year 2002 and is characterised with infrequent interventions of the great 
size depreciating operations have negative, means decreasing, effect on the volatility 
of the dollar/yen exchange rate, although the coefficient value is tiny. Watanabe and 
Harada (2006) demonstrate for the second regime the BoJ’s intervention reduces the 
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volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate, but the US Fed’s coordinated intervention 
does not enhance this stabilising effect. The last statement is also true for our results as 
estimated coefficient for dummy variable which reflects the coordination of the 
interventions with US Fed is significant and has a positive value which means 
coordinated interventions under the second regime tended to increase the volatility of 
the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
In most of the studies, the start of the second regime is associated with the 
appointment of Eisuke Sakakibara as Director General of the MoF’s International 
Finance Bureau in June 1995. But Hillebrand and Schnable found a structural break 
around the turn of the millennium. As a result, they divide the data into two regimes: 
from 1991 up to the late 1990s when Japanese foreign exchange interventions seem to 
have an increasing effect on the exchange rate volatility. Starting from the late 1990s, 
it seems to have the reducing effect on the volatility. From our perspective, despite the 
time shift, we can say that their findings also support our results for the second 
intervention regime. 
For the third regime, we have not found any statistically significant relationship 
between the frequent depreciating interventions of the great scale and the volatility of 
the dollar/yen exchange rate. We investigate this regime separately from the second 
one which might have caused certain problems due to the shortness of the data 
subsample (only 326 observations) and quite week specification of the ARIMA model 
as we had to regress the daily logarithmic returns on the error term, assuming that 
exchange rate is following a random walk. 
In some studies, such as Kim and Sheen (2006), Kim (2007) and Kim and Le 
(2010), the second and the third intervention regimes are considered together. 
For example, Kim (2007) argues that for daily exchange rate data interventions 
increase the currency market volatility both under the first regime and the second and 
the third intervention regimes combined. In contrast to this for the intra-daily data, this 
kind of effect of interventions on the volatility has a tendency to decrease when trading 
moved from Tokyo to New York (in this study data consist of Tokyo, London and New 
York trading). What is more, during London and New York trading the impact of 
intervention became significantly negative. 
For the first and the second intervention regimes, it is also important to note 
that in some situations monetary authority which is responsible for the intervention 
policy has to choose between two goals – whether they want to affect the level of the 
exchange rate or whether they aim to minimise the volatility of the currency market. 
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As we can observe from the Appendix D under the first regime depreciating 
interventions can be recognised as the successful ones in reducing the exchange rate 
daily returns (although with very tiny estimated value of -0,000004) but at the same 
time, these interventions resulted in the increased conditional variance. Hassan (2012) 
supports our finding with the conclusion that successful depreciation was achieved at 
the expense of higher volatility. In this study author also accounts the separate effects 
of frequency and size. Thus, more frequent intervention operations have a negative 
effect on both efficiencies regarding the level of the exchange rate and the volatility. 
Our results support the finding regarding the conditional mean as we can see that under 
the first regime interventions successfully reduced the level of the dollar/yen exchange 
rate while the volatility increased. On the other hand, we can conclude that it is true if 
we discuss opposite goals of the interventions under the first and second regimes. 
During 1991-1995 the BoJ was aiming to affect the level of the exchange rate so the 
increased volatility can be considered as the aside negative effect of the successful 
intervention policy as the level of the dollar/yen exchange rate declined. Contrary to 
this, during 1995-2002 the BoJ was to trying to stabilise the market and break a trend 
of appreciating yen. In this case, infrequent interventions of the greater scale 
successfully reduced the conditional variance of the exchange rate although the 
conditional mean has not been affected by the intervention operations conducted. 
Hoshikawa (2008) analyses the entire data sample and shows that frequent 
interventions are less effective regarding the effect on the level of the exchange rate, 
but they are willing to reduce the volatility of the currency market. As a result, his 
findings contradict with ours, but we suppose that it is not always efficient to apply the 
results of the examination of the full sample (which are recognised in most of the 
studies as inconclusive) to the two different intervention regimes. 
Under the fourth regime, intervention operations do not follow any specific 
pattern, so this data subsample cannot be called “regime” in a way that we apply this 
term to three latter periods. As we can observe from the Appendix D from April 2004 
till the end of 2011 both the level and the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate have 
not been affected by the foreign exchange interventions. 
The first intervention was conducted in September 2010. Its goal can be defined 
as the demolition of the yen’s upward trend against the US dollar, which arose after 
the crisis of 2008. The significant strengthening of the yen to major world currencies 
led to a sharp drop in revenues from export operations. Official authorities began to 
take active measures when the dollar’s exchange rate against the yen reached a 15-year 
low, falling below 83. The intervention was conducted on September 15, 2010, during 
which the BoJ spent 2 124,9 billion yen. Since it was necessary to increase the yen’s 
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offer in the market, the central bank sold the national currency and bought US dollars. 
During trading on September 15, 2010, the yen’s exchange rate changed from 82,83 to 
85,77 per US dollar. As a result of trading, the depreciation of the Japanese currency 
was 3.5%. The target of intervention is 85 yen per dollar. At this point, the yen lasted 
seven days; then the currency began to grow again. A month after the intervention, the 
exchange rate was 81,41 (-5% of the intervention level), after six months – 80,70 (-
5,9%). Thus, we can conclude that in the ultrashort period a positive effect was 
achieved by the intervention, but in the remaining periods, the results were negative 
(neither short-term nor medium-term upward trends were broken). 
The second intervention was carried out by the MoF on 18.03.2011. Its conduct 
was caused by a sharp increase in the yen’s rate to major world currencies in connection 
with the earthquake on 11.03.2011. For a few days after the disaster, the yen to dollar 
rate increased by 6,6% (from 81,88 to 76,43). During this period, the BoJ actively 
conducted consultations with central banks of G7 countries, during which agreements 
on collective intervention were reached, which was held on 18.03.2011, the volume of 
transactions amounted to 692,5 billion yen. 
We will evaluate the results of this operation, the purpose of which can be 
defined as the retention of the exchange rate near the target benchmark - 80 yen per US 
dollar and above. In the course of trading on 18.03.2011, the yen fell by 3,9% - from 
78,90 to 81,99, at this level, it lasted seven days. A month later, the yen to the 
US currency was 83,26 (2.4% to the level of intervention), after four months. – 79,06 
(-3,5%). Above the mark of 81 yen per dollar rate was 64 days. It can be stated that 
this currency intervention was effective in the short and short-term periods, the 
remaining time intervals - the result is negative. 
The third intervention was conducted on 04.08.2011. The target was also a rate 
of 80 yen per dollar. During the trading session, the rate has overcome this mark, but 
could not gain a foothold there and stopped at the level of 79,06. Already on the next 
day (05.08.2011), the trades ended at around 78,47, and in the future, the yen continued 
to strengthen against the dollar. The duration of the BoJ’s operations was one day, the 
total amount – 4 512,9 billion yen. 
In October-November 2011 there was the last series of interventions from 
31.10.2011 till 04.11.2011, the total amount was 9 091,7 billion yen. After the first 
intervention of the greatest size (8 072,2 billion yen) the exchange rate increased from 
75,82 yen per US dollar to 78,32. Until the end of the intervention series, the level of 
the exchange rate was fluctuating around the mean of 78,19 yen per US dollar with the 
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average intervention amount of 254,88 billion yen. The level was in the corridor 
between 76 and 78 until the beginning of February 2012, then it started appreciating 
and achieved its maximum (83,83 yen per US dollar) on March 14, 2012. All foreign 
exchange interventions conducted by the Japanese monetary authorities after the year 
2004, unfortunately, turned out to be ineffective regarding the effect on the level of the 
dollar/yen exchange rate and volatility. 
One of the potential reasons the interventions of the Japanese government 
ended unsuccessfully is the high demand for the Japanese national currency by non-
residents. This demand is formed by portfolio investors and speculators. Investors view 
Japanese government debt securities as a “protective asset” along with precious metals. 
As soon as the dollar and euro begin to depreciate, investors sharply increase the 
demand for “protective” assets, thereby contributing to the appreciation of the yen. 
Speculators are actively using the carry-trade strategy for Japanese financial 
assets. The essence of this strategy is that in a country with a low-interest rate they 
borrow money, buy assets with them in foreign currency, which will rise in price, after 
a certain time, the asset is sold, the foreign currency is changed into national currency, 
they receive income and return a loan. The income of speculators consists of two 
components: income from a foreign asset in the form of interest rate and exchange rate 
difference. It is the second component that is most significant and brings large profits 
to the speculators. After the crisis of 2008, the US Fed lowered the interest rate to 
0,25%. Also, government bonds were redeemed to increase the amount of money in 
the financial system. Banks and investment companies formed excess liquidity, which 
had to be invested in some short-term assets, while the quantitative easing of 
the US Fed. For example, buying a Japanese yen in 2009, it was possible to earn on 
changes in rates up to 6% in annual terms, and in 2010 - up to 12% per annum. This is 
a very high yield compared to traditional savings instruments: bank deposits and 
government bonds. Of course, the high return on investment in a foreign asset is always 
associated with a high risk. But the peculiarity of currency transactions with the 
Japanese yen is that players in the market are firmly confident in maintaining the 
growing trend for a long time, also, by their active purchases, traders strengthen the 
growing trend. 
Thus, all the reasons considered in its entirety do not allow the MoF, with the 
help of currency interventions, to reverse the situation in the foreign exchange market. 
At present, Japan feels the urgent need to stop the flow of short-term speculative capital 
to its financial market. The practice has shown that neither monetary measures nor 
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currency interventions are currently effective. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce 
tax instruments actively. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we use GARCH-in-mean model to evaluate the effects of the 
foreign exchange interventions conducted by the BoJ in the timeframe of 1991-2011 
on both level and volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. We add external 
independent variables to extend the model and use all the intervention data which are 
available for the analysis at the moment. The full data sample was divided into four 
subsamples with the dividing points commonly accepted in the related literature. 
According to the results that we have obtained from the separate estimation of 
the model under each of the intervention regimes, we come a conclusion that 
appreciating interventions do not have any significant effect neither on the level nor 
the volatility of the dollar/yen exchange rate. At the same time, depreciating 
interventions can trigger daily logarithmic returns when interventions are small and 
frequent but not when they are infrequent and large. We have found that depreciating 
interventions may have opposite effect on the volatility depending on their frequency 
and size. Thus, under the first regime volatility was increased by the operations of the 
Japanese monetary authorities but it was decreased under the second regime. 
Considering the first and the second subsamples which lasted from the year 1991 until 
March 2004 Japanese interventions were coordinated with the US Fed and these 
concerted actions have increased the volatility. 
Trying to control for the market conditions in the both Japanese and 
the US economies we include daily logarithmic returns of the most important market 
indices. According to our results volatility of the foreign exchange market in Japan is 
not affected by the alteration of the Nikkei index while it is partly determined by the 
movements of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. It again demonstrates us consistent 
dependency between the Japanese and American markets, especially when export and 
import balance is involved as it is the case for the exchange rate. 
Our motivation to use the GARCH-in-mean model was to examine if there is a 
dependency between the level of the exchange rate and its current volatility and to find 
if risk affects the returns under the particular intervention techniques employed by 
the BoJ. As archm component is significant only under the first regime, we cannot say 
that there is strong dependency between the conditional mean and conditional variance 
of the dollar/yen exchange rate. 
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We cannot see any considerable effect of the “news” or “surprises” on the 
conditional variance except for the fourth regime, so it does not seem the shocks, 
including the interventions, used to have any destabilising effect on the volatility of the 
market. On the other hand, the forecast variance from the previous periods does alter 
the current conditional variance under the second, third and fourth intervention regimes 
which support the major role of the persistence in volatility in the determination of the 
current level of the conditional variance for these three subsamples. 
Most of the studies conducted in previous years do not support our finding of 
the volatility under the third intervention regime. They either support the positive effect 
of the interventions on the volatility such as Hassan (2012), or the negative one as 
Hillebrand and Schnabl (2006). As in our study, we consider all the data subsamples 
separately we have not combined the second and the third regime although the other 
researchers had widely employed this approach. Under the third regime when 
interventions were frequent and of the great scale according to our results only the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average, means aggregated market situation in the US has a 
significant effect on the volatility. 
As for the remaining subsample that we call the “fourth” regime none of our 
external independent variables result in significantly estimated coefficients, so we try 
to analyse every operation separately regarding their effect mostly on the level of the 
exchange rate. We come to a conclusion that these interventions cannot be recognised 
as the successful ones as they could not force the exchange rate to stick to the target 
mark, although it was possible to achieve the goal within one trading day. This finding 
is also supporting regarding the short-lived impact of the intervention operations. 
There are some factors which affect the volatility and level of the exchange rate 
in the market and single intervention cannot be claimed as a universal tool which can 
change the long-term trend of the exchange rate development. On the other hand, as it 
can be observed from our findings, if interventions are conducted on as a consistent, 
planned and systematic series operations they can achieve their main goal, whether it 
is a certain level or the reduction of the volatility. In the ideal case, there should not be 
a trade-off for the monetary authority, but in reality, the BoJ has to sacrifice either the 
desired level of the dollar/yen exchange rate which is the of the extremely important 
indicators determining the trading balance of Japan, or stability of the currency market. 
The research on the volatility and its vulnerability under the interventions can 
be continued by fitting GARCH-in-mean model on the combined intervention regimes. 
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Also, the main point is that modelling the consequences of foreign exchange 
interventions for the exchange rate one cannot do without key macroeconomic 
indicators, such as national income, money supply, trading balance parameters. On the 
other hand, data on foreign exchange interventions are provided daily, while key 
macroeconomic parameters are at best monthly or quarterly. Thus, it would be 
problematic to include such heterogeneous data in the model. The problem of 
aggregating data - translating information on interventions into an annual or quarterly 
form or disaggregating - translating macroeconomic statistics into a form, at least, 
weekly, may prove to be unsolvable. Perhaps this is one of the problems why most of 
the empirical studies on the investigation of the foreign exchange interventions do not 
rely on macroeconomic statistics. It can be an innovative way to assess the real 
intervention effect more deeply if it would be possible to account for the market 
conditions not only by using aggregated indices but also by the inclusion of the real 
economic indicators. 
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Outcomes 
1. Changes in 




volatility but it is not 
volitility that causes 
intervention. 
2. Intervention need 
to be publicly known 
in order to influence 
volatility. 
3. Secret interventions 
generally increase 
volatility. 
4. Reported central 
bank intervention: full 
sample - lead to an 
increase in daily and 
long-term exchange 
rate volatility/ mid-
1980s - led to 
reductions on 
volatility. 
1. The positive effect 





2. When market is 
highly volatile and 
market participants 
expect the central 
bank to intervene, 
concerted 
interventions can have 
a stabilizing effect 
(signalling approach). 
3. Coordinated 
interventions lead to 
large effects in the 
foreign exchange 
market rather than 
unilateral ones. 
4. Impact of the 
intervention in the 
exchange rates 
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perceived motivation 
to intervene (more 
1. Intervention 
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large profits from 
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unrealized capital 
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to analyse 
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Effects of intervention 
on volatility 
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GARCH (1,1) component GARCH 
model 
GARCH Binary response 
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Outcomes 
1. For the sample as a 
whole, Japanese 
intervention 
operations had little 
predictive power as to 






1991 and 2004 were 
associated with a 
substantially higher-
than-expected 
frequency of both 
moderation and 
reversals in daily 
exchange rate 
movements, and 
therefore had forecast 
value relative to these 
two types of events. 
3. Intervention 
operations conducted 
in coordination with 
1. Unilateral 
operations are in 
general either 
ineffective or even 
counterproductive. 
2. Isolated large-scale 
interventions can 
produce the desired 
effects in terms of the 
exchange rate level. 
3. Large-scale 
operations should be 
favoured by the Bank 
of Japan. 
1. The BOJ’s 
intervention reduced 
only the short-run 
volatility component 
in the second half of 
the sample period, 
while it did not have 
any impact on 
volatility at all in the 
first half of the 
sample period. 
2. The stabilizing 
effect of the BOJ’s 
intervention in the 
second period was not 
enhanced by the Fed’s 
coordinated 
intervention. 
1. Global GARCH 
estimations are 
inconclusive. 
2. Local estimations 
confirm a structural 
break ocurring around 





remain unsterilized as 
a result of liquidity 
trap. 





volatility of the 
yen/dollar exchange 
rate. 
4. After 1997 foreign 
exchange intervention 
is associated with 
lower exchange rate 
1. The size of the 
amounts used in the 
interventions, 
coordination with 
another central bank 
as well as the 
presence of recent 
past operations are 
found to improve the 
detection of central 
bank operations. 
2. The Bank of Japan 
tended to favor secret 
operations when it 
was targeting its own 
level and when acting 
in the opposite 
direction to reducing 
the exchange rate 
misalignment. 
3. No evidence in 
favor of a noise 
trading strategy of the 
BoJ in the sense that 
its actions would have 
targeted both 
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those of U.S. 
monetary authorities, 
which occurred 
mainly in the early 
part of our sample 
period, met with a 
slightly higher 
frequency of success 
under several of our 
criteria than those of 
the Japanese 
authorities alone. 
4. Japanese foreign 
exchange 
interventions had a 
modest, but clearly 
detectable, impact, on 
short-term movements 
in the dollar-yen 
exchange rate. 




and the end of 2002 
met with a higher 
degree of success 





5. No support for a 
structural break in 
1995 (shift from small 
intervention to large 
interventions) and 
there is no evidence 
that multilateral 
intervention may have 




Appendix A: Description of the former empirical studies  48 
 
Authors 











threshold effects and 
asymmetric volatility: 





Intervention in the 
JPY/USD Exchange 
Rate Market: Is It 
Effective, and through 
Which Channel Does 
It Work? 
Modeling Exchange 
Rates using the 
GARCH Model 
Volatility and 
Spillover Effects of 






Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2016 












April 1, 1991 - March 
31, 2003 
1999-2004 1999-2010 2000-2004 
1991-2004 
Object of analysis 
Regime changes Effectiveness of 
intervention 
Distribution channel 

















Equal variance test 
Cointegrated VAR 
methodology 
Appendix A: Description of the former empirical studies  49 
 
Outcomes 
1. The effectiveness 
of foreign exchange 
intervention is 
dependent on the 
regimes of the 
exchange rates. 
2. Interventions are 
more effective in 
periods when there is 
massive depreciation 
in the JPY against the 
USD. 
3. Interventions by the 
two central banks are 
effective in reducing 
the volatility of 
returns to exchange 
rates only when the 
exchange rates are 
strongly appreciating. 
1. Actual intervention 
, whether or not the 
market is aware of the 
intervention, exerts a 
significant same-day 
influence on the 
JPY/USD exchange 
rate. 
2. The importance of 
the portfolio balance 
channel is supported 
by the data while no 
direct evidence of the 
information signaling 
channel is found. 
3. Official statements 
made during the 
period under study do 
not contain enough 
new information to 
significantly affect the 
exchange rate market. 
4. The first day of 
intervention following 
a no-intervention day 
has a larger than 
average impact on 
exchange rates. Some 
sample-specific 
1. None of the 
GARCH models 
captured the empirical 
nature of LPR prices 
partucularly well 
(sudden shift after 
recent financial 
crisis). 
2. Mixed results of 
residuals histograms. 
1. The BoJ’s 
interventions in the 
USD/JPY exchange 
rates decrease - 
although only in the 
short-term (less than 5 
hours) and in a 
discontinuous pattern 
- the volatility of the 
USD/JPY series. 
2. The interventions 
increase significantly 
the volatility of the 
euro/JPY series and 
the impact lasts for 
the whole of the 
intervention day. 
3. Interventions have 
some impact 
(decrease) on the 
covariance of 
exchange rates. The 
evidence produced for 
the spillover effect 
and the impact on 
covariances can have 
direct implications for 
portfolio management 
purposes. 
1. The fundamental 
factors and market 
conditions played 
important roles in the 
exchange rate 
dynamics. 
2. In all three regimes, 
shocks to the bond 
yield differential had 
strong long-run 
impact on speculation 
and sentiment, and 
exchange rate 
movements. 
3. The yield shocks 
stimulated speculation 
and sentiment on JPY, 
and worked as the 
main driving force of 
the whole system. 
Appendix A: Description of the former empirical studies  50 
 
evidence that the first 
day after intervention 
is associated with an 
adverse exchange rate 
adjustment is found. 
5. Intervention on any 
given day, whether or 
not the market is 
aware of the 
intervention 
operation, contains an 
expected as well as an 
unexpected 
component. 





5. Interventions cause 
the intraday returns to 
become less 
heteroskedastic for 
both exchange rates. 
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Appendix B.1: Absolute daily foreign exchange interventions and 
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Appendix B.2: Absolute daily foreign exchange interventions and 
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Appendix C: Comparison of BIC of various ARIMA models 
ARIMA order Regime I Regime II Regime III Regime IV 
ARIMA (2,0,2) with non-
zero mean -8 212,63 -13 670,86 -2 491,02 -14 279,99 
ARIMA (0,0,0) with non-
zero mean -8 222,09 -13 701,87 -2 503,70 -14 286,76 
ARIMA (1,0,0) with non-
zero mean -8 216,30 -13 693,61 -2 498,22 -14 293,02 
ARIMA (0,0,1) with non-
zero mean -8 215,34 -13 694,55 -2 499,05 -14 294,76 
ARIMA (0,0,0) with zero 
mean -8 224,88 -13 708,41 -2 507,50 -14 293,44 
ARIMA (1,0,1) with non-
zero mean -8 211,20 -13 686,02 -2 492,84 -14 288,10 
ARIMA (0,0,2) with non-
zero mean - - - -14 290,23 
ARIMA (1,0,2) with non-
zero mean - - - -14 287,79 
ARIMA (0,0,1) with zero 
mean - - - -14 301,25 
ARIMA (1,0,1) with zero 
mean - - - -14 294,52 
ARIMA (0,0,2) with zero 
mean - - - -14 296,63 
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ARIMA (1,0,2) with zero 
mean - - - -14 294,26 
Minimum value of criteria -8 224,88 -13 708,41 -2 507,50 -14 301,25 
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Appendix D: Model output 
 
Regime I 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
μ 0,00 0,00 -6,61 0% *** 
β1 0,05 0,01 7,96 0% *** 
b 0,000003 0,00 0,98 33% - 
s -0,000004 0,00 -5,03 0% *** 
c 0,002 0,00 13,31 0% *** 
n -0,04 0,01 -3,55 0% *** 
d 0,05 0,00 13,44 0% *** 
α -0,05 0,06 -0,92 36% - 
β -0,05 0,10 -0,52 60% - 
γ 0,22 0,08 2,85 0% *** 
b -0,001 0,00 -1,16 25% - 
s 0,001 0,00 3,55 0% *** 
c 1,52 0,44 3,47 0% *** 
n 3,69 3,87 0,95 34% - 






  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
μ 0,00 0,00 0,27 79% - 
β1 0,01 0,04 0,22 83% - 
b 0,000001 0,00 1,95 5% - 
s 0,000001 0,00 1,20 23% - 
c 0,02 0,00 32,61 0% *** 
n -0,02 0,01 -4,02 0% *** 
d 0,06 0,02 3,69 0% *** 
α -0,02 0,02 -1,59 11% - 
β 0,98 0,00 7 177,47 0% *** 
γ 0,09 0,00 28,75 0% *** 
b -0,00001 0,00 -0,62 54% - 
s -0,00003 0,00 -2,07 4% *** 
c 0,82 0,31 2,67 1% *** 
n 0,50 1,07 0,46 64% - 
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Regime III 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
μ 0,00 0,00 0,30 76% - 
β1 -0,27 0,39 -0,69 49% - 
s 0,00 0,00 0,17 86% - 
n -0,05 0,03 -1,85 6% - 
d 0,06 0,04 1,45 15% - 
α 0,13 0,09 1,36 17% - 
β 0,62 0,15 4,26 0% *** 
γ 0,24 0,28 0,83 40% - 
s 0,00 0,00 -0,13 89% - 
n -10,49 5,64 -1,86 6% - 
d 20,45 6,70 3,05 0% *** 
 
Regime IV 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
μ 0,00 0,00 -0,99 32% - 
ma1 -0,05 0,03 -1,92 5% - 
β1 0,04 0,07 0,54 59% - 
s 0,00 0,00 18,94 0% *** 
n 0,03 0,02 1,83 7% - 
d 0,15 0,05 2,89 0% *** 
α -0,05 0,02 -2,74 1% *** 
β 0,97 0,01 172,03 0% *** 
γ 0,14 0,03 4,73 0% *** 
s 0,00 0,00 -1,19 23% - 
n -1,88 1,23 -1,53 13% - 
d -3,67 1,99 -1,85 6% - 
 
 
